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ABSTRACT 
Gregory Currie has argued for the indispensability of i-desires – a kind of imaginative counter-
part of desires – by drawing a distinction between the satisfaction conditions of the desire-like 
states involved in our emotional responses to tragedies and those of genuine desires. Nev-
ertheless, Fiora Salis has recently shown that the same sort of distinction can also be found 
in nonfictional cases and has proposed a solution to the issue of satisfaction conditions that 
dispenses with i-desires. In this paper, I refute Salis’s stance and argue for the indispensability of 
i-desires. For this aim to be achieved, I first argue that the distinction between the satisfaction 
conditions of i-desires and those of desires can be given a different explanation, and that in this 
case, the same sort of distinction cannot arise in nonfictional cases; Secondly, I argue that we 
cannot make sense of the conflict between our desire-like states triggered by fictions and our 
background desires, and therefore i-desires should be introduced to avoid this conflict.
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RESUMO 
Gregory Currie defendeu a indispensabilidade dos i-desejos – um tipo de contraponto ima-
ginativo dos desejos – ao distinguir entre as condições de satisfação dos estados semelhan-
tes ao desejo envolvidos em nossas reações emocionais às tragédias e entre as mesmas 
com relação a desejos autênticos. No entanto, Fiora Salis mostrou recentemente que o 
mesmo tipo de distinção também pode ser encontrado em casos não ficcionais e propôs 
uma solução para a questão das condições de satisfação que dispensam i-desejos. Neste 
artigo, contesto a posição de Salis e argumento a favor da indispensabilidade dos i-desejos. 
Para que esse objetivo seja alcançado, argumento primeiramente que a distinção entre as 
condições de satisfação dos i-desejos e as dos desejos em si pode receber uma explicação 
diferente e que, nesse caso, o mesmo tipo de distinção não pode surgir em casos não fic-
cionais; Em segundo lugar, argumento que não podemos dar sentido ao conflito entre nos-
sos estados semelhantes ao desejo desencadeados por ficções e nossos desejos de fundo 
e, portanto, os i-desejos deveriam ser apresentados para evitar esse conflito.
Palavras-chave: I-desejos, imaginações de desejo, tragédia, desejos imaginativos.
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Introduction
Recently, several philosophers have argued that imagin-
ing can also be understood as an ability to copy or simulate any 
mental state. For example, Gregory Currie and Ian Raven-
scroft (2002) distinguish creative imagination from recreative 
imagination. The latter is a capacity for persp ective-shifting. 
Through recreative imagination, people can put themselves 
in nonactual situations and produce some imaginative states 
that are not perceptions, beliefs, or desires but are like these 
states. Alvin Goldman (2006a, 2006b) introduces the con-
cept of enactment-imagination that is a matter of creating or 
trying to create the simulation or the facsimile of a selected 
mental state in one’s own mind. Therefore, it seems that there 
are imaginative perception, imaginative belief (make-believe), 
imaginative emotion, and of course imaginative desire (here-
after, i-desire). 
The simulation theory of mindreading provides a pow-
erful argument for the existence of i-desires. Since the 1980s, 
several philosophers (Currie; Ravenscroft, 2002; Goldman, 
2006a; Gordon, 1986; Heal, 1986) claim that we explain the 
mental states of others and predict their behaviors through 
an imaginative simulation, a capacity to mentally project our-
selves into others’ situations. It seems that to do so, we must 
pretend or simulate the target’s states. This means that we 
must bring myself to imaginatively desire what the target de-
sires. Consider the following example: for a costume party, I 
made myself up as a vampire. While leaving the house, I met 
my neighbor. He threw his head back, bellowed a wordless 
roar, and dashed into his house. Why does my neighbor per-
form such behaviors? I need to put myself in his situation: 
I imaginatively believe that I am with a vampire and imagi-
natively desire to escape from the vampire. The two imagi-
native states can lead me to run or scream. So I understand 
why my neighbor acts this way. It seems that an imaginative 
desire is essential for understanding others. The “imaginative 
desires” are what we refer to as i-desires (Goldman, 2006a, p. 
48). It should also be noted that this argument does not de-
pend upon whether the simulation theory is the best theory 
of mindreading. In fact, as Kind (2016) said, those competing 
theories, such as the theory-theory, “(…) tend to admit that 
we engage in imaginative simulations of the sort postulated by 
simulation theorists – what’s primarily at issue between the 
two sides in the mindreading debate is not whether we sim-
ulate but whether such simulations are theory-laden” (Kind, 
2016, p. 166).
The current debate is focusing on whether or not i-de-
sires can account for our emotional responses to fictional 
charact ers and events.2 Some philosophers argue that genu-
ine desires cannot account for these, citing three reasons to 
support their claim: (1) Desires are governed by normative 
constraints: one cannot desire something that is unattainable. 
As we never believe that fictional situations or charact ers are 
real, we do not have relevant desires about fictional objects 
(Velleman, 2000, p. 260). Similarly, Currie claims that ‘‘De-
sires can be shown to be unreasonable, or at least unjustified, 
if they fail to connect in various ways with the facts’’ (Cur-
rie, 2002, p. 211).3 However, my desire that Desdemona not 
die does not become unreasonable even though I know that 
Desdomona does not exist. (2) Desires are intrinsically mo-
tivational: to desire p is to be disposed to act in ways that will 
bring about p. However, in engaging with fictions, people are 
not always disposed to act (Currie, 2002, p. 211). (3) Doggett 
and Egan (2007, 2012) argue that there is no adequate way to 
understand the content of these desire-like states if they are 
genuine desires. Consider my desire that Desdomona not die. 
It cannot be understood as a desire that, according to the story, 
Desdomona is safe, because I have a contrary desire that, ac-
cording to the story, Desdomona dies (maybe because I think 
that this is better for the story). It also cannot be understood 
as a desire that the fictional charact er Desdomona be safe be-
cause the content of this desire rationally requires that one 
has the corresponding desire about the fiction. This entails 
that I have a desire that, according to the story, Desdomo-
na is safe. Opponents of i-desire claim that these reasons are 
implausible. Reason (1) implies that we cannot desire things 
that are unattainable. However, in daily life, we often have a 
variety of desires toward things that are not actual. One often 
has desires about the past, the future, counterfactual events, 
and so forth (Kind, 2011, p. 425). Reason (2) claims that 
desires are intrinsically motivational. However, we can find 
many cases in which desires are inert. Alfred Mele (1995, p. 
394) suggests that a person driving to the airport to pick up 
friends may desire that the plane took off on time. In this case, 
the person’s desire is inert because it is about past events. In 
addition, Carruthers (2003) also suggests that ‘‘real desires 
will normally lead to real act ions only when interact ing with 
real beliefs’’. I am not motivated to save Desdemona because 
I does not believe that Desdemona is a real person (see also 
Kind, 2011, p. 426-427). Reason 3) claims that contradictory 
desires make us irrational. But Kind (2011, p. 429) noticed 
that contradictory desires are commonplace. For instance, 
a mother may want her only child to go away to university 
because she believes that it is necessary for his own good. Si-
multaneously, she may want her son to stay home because she 
fears having an empty nest.
Recently, Gregory Currie (2010) proposed a new argu-
ment in favor of the indisp ensability of i-desires. He argues 
that desire-like states triggered by fictions must be introduced 
2 There is also a debate about whether i-desires can motivate agents (e.g., Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002, p. 111-133; Doggett and Egan, 
2007; Funkhouser and Spaulding, 2009; Kind, 2011, p. 432-438; Schellenberg, 2013, p. 514-517; Van Leeuwen, 2011, p. 61-66; 2014, p. 
796-797). But in this paper, I only focus on whether i-desires can account for our affective responses to fictional characters.
3 See also Doggett and Egan, 2012, p. 286.
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to account for our emotional responses to tragic fictions, but 
if these desire-like states are understood as desires, then there 
is no way to sp ecify their satisfact ion conditions; so these 
desire-like states should be regarded as i-desires. Fiora Salis 
(2016) has proposed a solution to the problem of satisfact ion 
conditions that disp enses with i-desires; she has shown that 
the same sort of discrepancy between the satisfact ion con-
ditions of i-desires and those of desires can also be found in 
nonfictional cases, so there is no need to introduce i-desires to 
account for our emotional engagement with fictions.
In this paper, I rebut Salis’s argument and argue for the 
indisp ensability of i-desires. The second and third Sections 
state, as exactly as possible, Currie’s argument for i-desires 
and Salis’s objection. The fourth Section draws a distinction 
ignored by Currie and Salis between the satisfact ion condi-
tions of i-desires and of desires and argues that this sort of 
distinction cannot arise in nonfictional cases. The fifth Sec-
tion proposes another argument for the indisp ensability of 
i-desires: if the desire-like states triggered by fictions are un-
derstood as desires, then our emotional responses to tragic 
fictions will involve a conflict that we cannot make sense of 
from our daily experience, so i-desires should be introduced 
to avoid this conflict. 
Currie’s argument for i-desires
Currie’s argument is based on his analysis of our emo-
tional responses to tragedies, which he noted involve two 
contradictory mental states. We often want the fiction to 
go a certain way; in other words, we want a tragedy to end 
tragically in order to read an amazing story. For example, we 
wish for Anna Karenina to unfold in such a way that Anna 
commits suicide. Additionally, in being engaged in fiction, we 
feel sympathy, pity, anxiety, and so forth, which implies that 
we wish that tragic events do not occur in the fiction. In the 
case of Anna Karenina, we also do not want Anna to lose her 
life. Thus, our emotional responses can be charact erized by 
the following two contradictory states:
(1) We want the fiction to be such that something, E, 
occurs in it. 
(2) We react in ways that make it tempting to say that 
we want E not to occur (Currie, 2010, p. 632).
Currie claims that (2) raises a question of whether the 
tempting thing to say is the right thing, and he suggests that 
there are three solutions to interpret (2). According to the 
simple solution,4 (2) is equivalent to: 
(3) We desire that E not occur.
According to the simple solution, the tempting thing to 
say is the right thing. (3) is a desire and its content is that the 
fictional event does not occur. In the case of Anna Karenina, 
by combining (1) and (3), we have a desire for the novel to 
unfold in such a way that Anna commits suicide and also a 
desire that Anna not die.
According to the change-of-content solution,5 (3) is false. 
The right thing should be to say:
(4) We desire the fiction to be such that E not occur.
The change-of-content solution requires that the content 
of the desire includes reference to the fiction; our desire is not 
directed to the event included in the fiction, but rather the fic-
tion itself. By combining (1) and (4), we have a desire for Anna 
Karenina to unfold in a way that Anna commits suicide and 
further desire it to be a novel wherein she does not die.
According to the change-of-attitude solution, (3) gets the 
content right but the attitude wrong. Thus, (3) should be re-
placed with:
(5) We i-desire that E not occur.
Our mental state is directed to the fictional event itself. 
The state is not a desire, but rather an i-desire, an imaginative 
counterpart of desire. By combining (1) and (5), we desire 
Anna Karenina to be a story wherein Anna die, and we have 
an i-desire that Anna not die.
Currie argues resp ectively that both the change-of-con-
tent solution and the simple solution are problematic. The 
change-of-content solution does not properly account for our 
emotional responses to tragedies. It indicates that we want 
a tragedy to end tragically but also want it not to include 
tragic endings. That requires that we are ambivalent about 
the tragic ending we want, but most people feel no ambiv-
alence about what they want for the ending. Moreover, the 
change-of-content solution also implies that we must always 
be disappointed because we cannot always get what we want 
in having two conflicting states. However, disappointment is 
not our emotional response to tragedies. Doggett and Egan 
explain: ‘‘If you were so conflicted, the fiction would disap-
point you by not giving you everything you want. But Romeo 
and Juliet was not disappointing for us in this way’’ (Doggett; 
Egan, 2012, p. 281-282).
To rebut the simple solution, Currie imagines a counter-
example in which the charact er in fiction is real: 
Suppose I’m watching a BBC drama, set in 
the 1980s, called Death of a Prime Minister 
which imagines the assassination of Margaret 
Thatcher and its political aftermath. I stipu-
late: (i) watching the play, I desire that, in the 
play, Mrs. Thatcher is killed [...] (ii) as a matter 
of fact, I admire Mrs. Thatcher, and wish her 
a long and happy life (Currie, 2010, p. 633). 
It seems that, according to the simple solution, i) and ii), 
resp ectively, are equivalent to 1) and 3): I have a desire for the 
play to be such that Mrs. Thatcher is killed and also have a de-
sire that Mrs. Thatcher is not killed. However, Currie claims 
4 Carruthers (2003), Kind (2011), Spaulding (2015) and Salis (2016) should be regarded as the proponents of the simple solution.
5 Nichols (2004), Weinberg and Meskin (2005) and Schellenberg (2013) may be the upholders of the change-of-content solution.
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that i) and ii) cannot elicit a tragic response to the drama, be-
cause (i) and (ii) ‘‘leave it entirely open how I respond to the 
fiction’’ (Currie, 2010, p. 634). Although I really admire Mrs. 
Thatcher, I may still be on the side of the assassin if the story is 
so excellent and changes my persp ective. In this case, I might 
have a desire (iii) that Mrs. Thatcher die. The combination of 
(i) and (iii) cannot elicit a tragic response, because (i) corre-
sponds to (1) but (iii) contradicts (3); it is not consistent with 
the simple solution.
According to Currie, a simple theorist may tweak their 
theory by claiming that I have a background desire that Mrs. 
Thatcher has a good life, but also have a condition-dependent 
desire that Mrs. Thatcher is killed, and neither desire is domi-
nated by more salient contrary desires.6 The desire that Mrs. 
Thatcher have a good life is a stable, long-term and background 
desire. But when watching the drama, I come to have an occa-
sional desire that she die. This desire is triggered by watching the 
drama and is regarded as a condition-dependent desire.
Currie’s objection is that the condition-dependent de-
sire that Mrs. Thatcher is killed has a different satisfact ion 
condition. My background desire that Mrs. Thatcher have a 
good life is satisfied if she has a good life, but the so-called “de-
sire triggered by tragedy” is not satisfied even if Mrs. Thatcher 
is killed. In other words, my desire-like state triggered by fic-
tion is not satisfied by what happens but by what happens in 
the fiction; my “desire” that Mrs. Thatcher is killed is satisfied 
if and only if she is killed according to the fiction. The satisfac-
tion conditions of a desire-like state triggered by fiction must 
include reference to fiction. However, the propositional content
of my desire-like state does not include reference to fiction. 
In other words, what I “desire” is that Mrs. Thatcher is killed, 
but is not that she is killed in the fiction. Currie (2010, Note 7) 
notices that we can have genuine desires about the story. For 
instance, one person can desire that Mrs. Thatcher is killed in 
the fiction. Although my desire-like state that Mrs. Thatcher 
is killed and the desire that she is killed in the fiction have the 
same satisfact ion condition, they are not the same attitude, 
because the propositional content of the latter includes ref-
erence to the fiction, but the former does not. At this point, 
Currie proposes a distinction between desires and i-desires: 
(SC) A putative desire, A, is an i-desire and not really a 
desire if A has satisfact ion conditions, a canonical statement 
of which makes reference to a fiction which is not also the 
object of A (Currie, 2010, p. 635). 
My desire that Mrs. Thatcher thrive is a desire because 
its satisfact ion conditions does not include reference to a 
fiction; my desire-like state that Mrs. Thatcher is killed is 
an i-desire because its satisfact ion conditions include refer-
ence to a fiction, and the fiction is not the object of my state. 
Therefore, the change-of-attitude theory is right, but the sim-
ple theory is not plausible.
Salis’s objection to 
Currie’s argument
Salis (2016) counters that Currie’s argument about the 
satisfact ion conditions is based on a restrictive notion of de-
sires. To show that the two conflicting states involved in our 
emotional response to fiction can also be found in some non-
fictional cases, she imagines the following example:
Suppose that I attend for the first time a 
training session on the impact of stress 
on decision-making in a laboratory for be-
havioural neuroscience. The experiment 
includes brain surgery on subjects, usually 
rats, which eventually causes their death. 
When I attend the experiment, I have the 
following desire: (iv) I want the experiment 
to be such that the rat dies (suppose that is 
the only way to gather the necessary data). 
Yet, I am also perturbed by the death of the 
rat. In other words, I react in ways that make 
it tempting to say that I have another desire: 
(v) I want that the rat not die (Salis, 2016, 
section 5, p. 112).  
Salis claims that the combination of (iv) and (v), like (i) 
and (ii) in the case of Mrs. Thatcher, leaves it completely open 
how I react to the experiment. Although I support the well-
being of animals, I may still hope that the rat is killed because I 
focus on the lab experiment and have a desire that the rat die. 
So, my response to the lab experiment would not be tragic.7
Like Currie, Salis claims that we can modify the propo-
sal by claiming that the lab experiment is tragic for me if I 
have a background desire that the rat not die and a condi-
tion-dependent desire that the rat die, and neither desire is 
dominated by more salient contrary desires. In the case, I 
have two desires: one is a background desire that the rat not 
die; another is a condition-dependent desire that the rat die. 
The condition-dependent desire is an occasional state trigge-
red by the experiment. The two desires can be represented as:
(6) I desire that the rat die.
(7) I desire that the rat not die.
(7) is a background desire, and 6) is a condition-dependent 
desire triggered by the experiment. Thus, the combination of (6) 
and (7) elicits a tragic response to the lab experiment.
6 Currie claims that proponents of the simple solution introduce the notion of a condition-dependent desires. It seems that those de-
sire-like states about fictional characters or events are triggered by the fiction; while we do not engage with fictions, we do not have 
such desires. But it should also be noted that some proponents of the simple solution such as Carruthers (2003), Kind (2011) or Spauld-
ing (2015), do not mention the concept of condition-dependent desires.
7 It should be noted that Salis does not really think that the combination of desires regarding the lab rat elicits a tragic response.  Salis 
attaches an asterisk to “tragic response” in her paper.
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According to Salis, the combination of the two desires is 
similar to that of a background desire and a condition-depen-
dent desire triggered by the fiction in Currie’s example. My 
background and long-term desire (7) that the rat not die is 
satisfied if the rat does not die, but my condition-dependent 
desire (6) that the rat die is not satisfied while the rat escapes 
from the cage and is killed in another way. In other words, 
my desire that the rat not die is satisfied by what happens to 
the rat, but my desire that the rat die is satisfied not by what 
happens to the rat, but by what happen in the experiment. So, 
the satisfact ion conditions of the desire (6) that the rat die 
would not be simply that the rat dies, but that it dies in the 
experiment. Moreover, the propositional content of the desire 
(6) does not include reference to the lab experiment. It seems 
that (6) corresponds to the state triggered by the fiction in 
Currie’s example. As a consequence, we should also introduce 
a novel desire-like state: x-desire.
(SC*): A putative desire, B, is an x-desire and not really 
a desire if B has satisfact ion conditions, a canonical statement 
of which makes reference to a lab experiment that is not also 
the object of B.
The same discrepancy between the satisfact ion con-
ditions of desires and those of desire-like states triggered by 
some particular reference can be found not only in fictional 
cases but also in nonfictional cases. By (SC), we conclude that 
the desire-like state triggered by fiction is an i-desire; simi-
larly, it seems that by (SC*), we should conclude that the de-
sire-like state triggered by the experiment is not really a desire 
but an x-desire, an e-desire. Moreover, according to Salis, pos-
tulating a novel kind of mental state that is relativized to the 
context of a lab experiment would be highly implausible. She 
said “(…) no one would introduce a new mental state to ex-
plain our react ion to the lab experiment or to any other cases 
that do not engage our imagination” (Salis, 2016, Section 5, p.
114). Similarly, we have no reason to introduce an i-desire to 
explain our react ion to the fictional case. So, we cannot affirm 
the indisp ensability of i-desires by drawing a distinction be-
tween the satisfact ion conditions of desires and of i-desires. 
The propositional contents 
of desire-like states and their 
satisfaction conditions
If Currie’s purpose is to distinguish desires from i-desires 
by showing that the satisfact ion conditions of i-desires include 
reference to fictions and those of desires do not include it, the 
same sort of distinction is also found in nonfictional cases. 
However, the distinction between the satisfact ion conditions 
of i-desires and those of desires can also be seen as a relation-
ship between the satisfact ion conditions and the truth values of 
propositional contents: if a desire is satisfied, then the content 
of the desire is true, but when an i-desire is satisfied, then the 
propositional content of i-desire is not always true. I propose 
that the distinction circumvents Salis’s objection.
Consider the following four sentences:
(a) The rats die in the lab experiment.
(b) The rats die in the real world.
(c) Mrs. Thatcher dies in the fiction.
(d) Mrs. Thatcher dies in the real world.
It seems that “the real world” is a larger set of events 
and facts that include “the lab experiment”. In other words, 
what has happened in the lab experiment has also happened in 
the real world; “the lab experiment” is included in “in the real 
world”. Therefore, although the sentence (a) does not literally 
include “in the real world”, it is also bound by the operator “in 
the real world”. It follows that proposition (b) can be inferred 
from proposition (a): if the rats die in the lab experiment, 
then the rats also die in the real world. But proposition (a) 
cannot be inferred from proposition (b) (it is possible that the 
rats die of hunger in the real world instead of being killed in 
the lab experiment).
Yet what has happened in the fiction is isolated from 
the real world. Romeo dies in fiction instead of in the real 
world; Sherlock Holmes does not live in the real world but 
rather in the London of the novel; Captain Haddock is Tin-
tin’s friend in comics, not in the real world. Works of fiction 
can sometimes reveal some of the features of the real world 
but it cannot be shown that what has happened in fiction can 
truly happen in the real world. Another difference between 
the operators “in the experiment” and “in the fiction” is that 
the lab experiment has a causal link with real-world features, 
but the fiction does not have such a link. The lab experiment 
can change real-world features. In Salis’s example, the rats that 
died in the experiment reduce the number of rats living in the 
real world, but the rats that die in fiction cannot do that. So it 
seems that sentence (d) cannot be inferred from sentence (c): 
“Mrs. Thatcher dies in the fiction” does not entail that “Mrs. 
Thatcher dies in the real world”.
The distinction between the two concepts “in the fic-
tion” and “in the experiment” can also apply to the satisfact ion 
conditions of desire-like states. In Salis’s example, the subject 
has a desire that the rats die; as a condition-dependent state, 
it is triggered by the experiment. According to Salis, the sat-
isfact ion conditions of the desire include reference to the ex-
periment, which is not the propositional content of the de-
sire: if the desire that the rats die is satisfied, then the rats die 
in the lab experiment. Thereafter, since what has happened in 
the lab experiment has also happened in the real world, while 
the desire that the rats die is satisfied, the rats die not only 
in the lab experiment but also in the real world. According 
to the rule of conjunction elimination, one can conclude that 
the rats die in the real world. On the other hand, it seems that 
while the rats die in the real world, the proposition that the 
rats die is true (Concretely, we ought to claim that the prop-
osition that the rats die in the real world is true. But while we 
don’t emphasize that a proposition is bound by the fiction, we 
can remove the operator “in the real world” without changing 
its truth value and meaning). Therefore, we have reached a 
temporary conclusion: if the condition-dependent desire that 
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the rats die is satisfied, then its propositional content that the 
rats die is true.8 Usually, while one desires that A is Ф (A is Ф
is the propositional content of the desire), if the desire is satis-
fied, then the propositional content A is Ф is true; otherwise, 
the desire is not satisfied or is not a desire.
In Currie’s example, the subject has a condition-depen-
dent desire triggered by the fiction: a desire that Mrs. Thatch-
er die. The satisfact ion condition of the desire includes refer-
ence to fiction. So we say that if the desire that Mrs. Thatcher 
die is satisfied, then Mrs. Thatcher dies in the fiction. Since 
what has happened in the fiction is isolated from the real 
world, one cannot infer that Mrs. Thatcher dies in the real 
world from the proposition that she dies in the fiction. While 
Mrs. Thatcher is killed in the fiction, she might die in the 
real world but might also have a good life in the real world. 
The proposition that Mrs. Thatcher is killed in the fiction is 
independent of the real-world features. Hence, if the desire 
that Mrs. Thatcher die is satisfied, its propositional content 
that Mrs. Thatcher dies is not always true.9 It seems that the 
satisfact ion conditions of a desire triggered by the fiction are 
different from a normal desire. 
If a condition-dependent desire triggered by the fiction 
has satisfact ion conditions different from normal desires, why 
do we still insist that it is a kind of desire? It seems that we 
should introduce i-desires to account for the desire-like states. 
So I propose a distinction between desires and i-desires: 
(SC1) If a desire-like state “A is Ф” is a desire, then if the 
desire-like state is satisfied, “A is Ф” is true (“A is Ф” is the 
propositional content of a mental state);
(SC2) If a desire-like state “A is Ф” is an i-desire, then 
while the desire-like state is satisfied, the truth value of the 
propositional content “A is Ф” is not fixed (“A is Ф” is either 
true or false).10
In Currie’s example, the desire that Mrs. Thatcher thrive 
is a desire because if it is satisfied, then its propositional con-
tent is true, but the state that Mrs. Thatcher is killed is not 
a desire but an i-desire because it satisfies (SC2): while my 
desire-like state that Mrs. Thatcher is killed is satisfied, the 
truth value of the proposition that Mrs. Thatcher dies is not 
fixed; we don’t know if Mrs. Thatcher is truly killed or not.
In Salis’s example, the desire that the rats die is a desire, 
not an i-desire or x-desire, because it satisfies (SC1): while my 
desire that the rats die is satisfied, the proposition that the 
rats die is true.
To summarize, I have proposed a distinction between 
desires and i-desires: if a desire is satisfied, then its proposi-
tional content is true, but if an i-desire is satisfied, then its 
content is either true or false. The distinction indicates that 
a desire-like state triggered by fictions, which is introduced 
by Currie, should be regarded as an i-desire, but a desire-like 
state triggered by the lab experiment, which is introduced by 
Salis, should not be regarded as an i-desire but a genuine de-
sire. In such a way, I have circumvented Salis’s objections. I 
admit that my argument cannot decisively est ablish that the 
thesis of i-desires is the best account of our engagement with 
fiction. But, at least, the argument suffices to undermine Salis’ 
objections. In the next section, I would argue why i-desires are 
indisp ensable in the account of our engagement with fiction.
Why we cannot make sense 
of the conflicting desires 
about fictions
In this section, independently of the problem of the sat-
isfact ion conditions of desires, I argue that in being engaged 
in tragedy fictions, the subject has two conflicting desire-like 
states, and if these desire-like states are understood as desires, 
we cannot make sense of them because it cannot be under-
stood in a way that we account for the conflicting desires in 
daily life. To avoid this conflict, i-desires must be introduced.
Reconsider Currie’s example: 
Suppose I’m watching a BBC drama, set in 
the 1980s, called Death of a Prime Minister 
which imagines the assassination of Mar-
garet Thatcher and its political aftermath. I 
stipulate: (i) watching the play, I desire that, 
in the play, Mrs. Thatcher is killed [...] (ii) as 
a matter of fact, I admire Mrs. Thatcher, and 
wish her a long and happy life (Currie, 2010, 
p. 633). 
A proponent of the simple solution may think that i) 
and ii) are, resp ectively, equivalent to e) and f): 
(e) I desire that Mrs. Thatcher die.
(f) I desire that Mrs. Thatcher not die.
(e) is a desire triggered by the fiction, (f) is a background 
and long-term desire. It seems that being engaged in fiction, 
one often has two conflicting attitudes toward charact ers: 
one wants the fiction to be such that some tragic events occur, 
but as a matter of fact, one also wants that the events do not 
8 Yet, when the propositional content of the desire that rats die is true, the desire is not always satisfied, because we can infer the propo-
sition that the rats die in the real world from the proposition that the rats die in the experiment, but cannot reversely make an inference.
9 You might think that the propositional content is that Mrs. Thatcher die in the fiction. In other words, the subject has a desire that Mrs. 
Thatcher die in the fiction. But if the propositional content of a condition-dependent desire includes the reference “in the fiction”, the 
simple solution is equivalent to the change-of-content solution, which is implausible in explaining our emotional response to tragedies. 
It should be noted that I do not modify the content of desire-like state, but only consider their truth-conditions.
10 (SC1) and (SC2) are not the definition of i-desires or desires. They are only a necessary distinction between desires and i-desires. I admit that 
mere truth-conditions cannot individualize i-desires or desires. In daily life, while we judge that a desire-like state is an i-desire, we need not 
only its truth-condition, but also to understand the objects of the attitude, the current situations and the relevant cognitive states.
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occur. In Currie’s example, the conflicting attitudes are repre-
sented as (e) and (f), two contradictory desire-like states. In 
this section, we do not consider if they are enough to elicit my 
tragic response but do consider whether or not the case of the 
conflicting desires can be explained in a way that we explain 
conflicting desires in daily life.
Conflicting desires are entirely possible in daily life. One 
can have a desire for a short-term goal that is contrary to a 
long-term goal. For example, one person can desire to smoke 
while desiring to remain healthy. In addition, our desires can 
also be directed to one object by virtue of its different asp ects; 
for example, somebody can desire to drink beer by virtue of 
its taste but not desire to drink it by virtue of its consequences 
on his or her health. The proponents of the simple solution 
also state that one person can have a condition-dependent de-
sire that contradicts his or her background desires. A person 
with a background desire to stay sober may have a desire to 
drink when being confronted with alcohol. Il seems that (e) 
can be regarded as a short-term or condition-dependent de-
sire, and (f) can be seen as a long-term or background desire. 
Thus, the tension which I feel in watching the drama should 
comes from a conflict between two kinds of desires.
Nevertheless, conflicting desires in daily life cannot be ap-
plied to cases of fiction. One reason in favor of my thesis is that 
conflicting desires cannot be satisfied simultaneously. If someone 
drinks beer, his or her desire to drink was satisfied, while if he 
or she did not drink beer, his or her desire to stay sober may be 
satisfied, but both of these desires cannot be satisfied simultaneously. 
In Salis’s example, one person has a desire, triggered by the lab 
experiment, that the rats die and also has a background desire 
that the rats do not die. The two desires are in conflict with each 
other, and they also cannot be simultaneously satisfied. While 
the rats are killed in the experiment, one’s background desire is 
not satisfied; while the rats thrive, one’s desire for the lab experi-
ment cannot be satisfied. There are no states of affairs that satisfy 
the two desires. However, it is surprising that both (e) and (f), 
two conflicting desires about charact ers, can be satisfied simul-
taneously. Suppose that at the end of my story, Mrs. Thatcher 
is murdered; Death of a Prime Minister ends tragically, so my 
desire (e) is satisfied. But suppose that, simultaneously, I know 
that Mrs. Thatcher is living a good life in real life. My desire (f) 
is then also satisfied, which entails that both of my conflicting 
desire-like states are satisfied simultaneously, a feature that the 
conflicting desires in daily life cannot have. Therefore, the com-
bination of (e) and (f) cannot be understood as a combination of 
background desires and condition-dependent desires. I conclude 
that conflicting desires in daily life cannot be applied to cases of 
fiction, and the conflicting desires about fictional charact ers are 
utterly different from anything in daily life. 
 There are seemingly two ways to account for the prob-
lem. One is to say that the two desires are not intrinsically 
conflicting; another is to admit the two states are conflicting, 
but to say that one of them is not a desire. 
According to the first view, opponents can give two pro-
posals against my thesis: A) Mrs. Thatcher in Death of a Prime 
Minister is not real but rather a fictional charact er; or B) the 
content of my desire is not that Mrs. Thatcher is killed but 
rather that in the play, Mrs. Thatcher is killed. The proposal 
A) is implausible. As has been recently demonstrated by Cur-
rie (2010) and Friend (2003), real individuals can be fiction-
alized, but the fictionalized individuals are still real (Currie, 
2010, p. 634). Often, authors put real individuals in their fic-
tion to influence our judgments about them and broaden the 
appeal of works of fiction. 
According to B), we get the following expression:
(e*) I desire that Mrs. Thatcher die in the play.
(e*) concerns the fiction, but (f) concerns a real person. 
The two desires are not intrinsically conflicting. Neverthe-
less, the difference in the content of desires cannot rule out 
the conflict in one’s mental states. Even if one knows that (e*) 
and (f) are not contradictory, one may still experience a ten-
sion of conflicting states. Although I know that Mrs. Thatch-
er is killed only in the fiction, and in reality life she has a good 
life, I might still experience a tension of conflicting states in 
watching the drama. Moreover, suppose that in Salis’s exam-
ple, (6) is equivalent to (8):
(8) I desire that the rats die in the lab experiment.
When the rats die in the experiment, my desire (8) is 
satisfied, and my desire (7) is not; when the rats do not die in 
the experiment, my desire (7) is satisfied, and my desire (8) is 
not. There is no state of affairs that makes the rats die in the 
lab experiment and still live in the real world. However, (e*) 
and (f) can still be satisfied at the same time. Suppose that 
Mrs. Thatcher is killed in the drama and is still alive in the 
real world; that makes my two desires satisfied at the same 
time. Hence, the combination of (e*) and (f) still has a feature 
that the conflicting desires in daily life cannot have. 
One might also claim that (e) and (f) are not contra-
dictory, because their satisfact ion conditions are not mutually 
contradictory. If one thinks that their satisfact ion conditions 
are not contradictory, one must agree that the satisfact ion 
condition of my desire that Mrs. Thatcher die includes ref-
erence to fiction. Thus, you accept implicitly that the satis-
fact ion conditions of a desire triggered by fiction are different 
from those of a normal desire; a desire triggered by fiction 
that Mrs. Thatcher die is not satisfied even if Mrs. Thatcher 
dies, but a normal desire that Mrs. Thatcher die is satisfied if 
she dies. As demonstrated in section 4, the difference implies 
the existence of i-desires. Therefore, opponents cannot avoid 
the commitments of i-desires.
According to the second view, if (e) and (f) are different 
states, then one can avoid the problem of conflicting desires. 
I propose that the subject has two kinds of attitudes: desire 
and i-desire. In watching the drama, I have an i-desire that 
Mrs. Thatcher be killed. But, simultaneously, I also have a 
background desire that Mrs. Thatcher not be killed. Since an 
i-desire is not a desire, but a particular form of imagination, 
the combination of (5) and (6) need not have the feature 
which conflicting desires should have. Both conflicting states 
can be satisfied simultaneously, because they are two differ-
Yuchen Guo
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ent kinds of attitudes. By not introducing conflicting desires 
that cannot be understood in daily life, one can better explain 
the difference between our attitudes toward fiction and those 
in daily life. I indirectly argue for the indisp ensability of i-de-
sires: if i-desires are not introduced, one cannot make sense of 
the cases of conflicting desires about charact ers. 
Dogget and Egan (2012) argue that there is no ade-
quate way to understand the content of my desire that Des-
demona not die. It cannot be understood as a desire that, 
according to the story, Desdemona is safe, because I have 
a contrary desire that, according to the story, Desdemona 
dies, and because it’s irrational for one person to have two 
conflicting desires. But Kind (2011, p. 429) rebutted this 
argument because she noticed that contradictory desires 
are very commonplace. My point is not that it is irrational 
or impossible for having two conflicting desires, but rather 
that the conflicting states about fictional charact ers cannot 
be understood as the case of conflicting desires, because the 
two conflicting states can be satisfied at the same time.11
Unlike Currie’s argument, my argument does not rely on 
our tragic emotions; we don’t need to analyse the constitu-
tion of our tragic emotions in order to affirm the existence 
of i-desires. Hence, I conclude that my argument is better 
than other those involving conflicting states.12
Conclusion
Our emotional responses to tragedies are charact erized 
by two conflicting desire-like states. Suppose that E refers to 
tragic events. The tragic responses imply that we have a de-
sire-like state, triggered by the tragedy, that E occur. I have ar-
gued that the desire-like state triggered by the tragedy has sat-
isfact ion conditions that are different from genuine desires: 
while a desire is satisfied, its content is true, but while a de-
sire-like state triggered by the tragedy is satisfied, its content 
is not always true. So I proposed that the desire-like state is an 
i-desire for the reason that its satisfact ion conditions cannot 
be understood in a way that we understand a genuine desire. 
Salis has recently argued for the disp ensability of i-desires by 
showing that a genuine desire sometimes has satisfact ion con-
ditions similar to a desire-like state triggered by the tragedy. 
My argument can avoid her objections and justify the indis-
pensability of i-desires.
On the other hand, I have also proposed another argu-
ment for i-desires, independent of the problem of the satis-
fact ion conditions of desires: as demonstrated by Currie, our 
emotional responses to tragedies are charact erized by two 
conflicting desire-like states, but the conflicting states cannot 
be understood as desires because they have a feature – name-
ly, that they can be satisfied at the same time – that conflicting 
desires in daily life cannot have. So i-desires must be intro-
duced to make sense of them. 
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